Introduction
Successful
money managers do much more than select winning stocks. They use weighting of
their selections, timing of their transactions, partial trading actions and
timely admitting of mistakes.
Lessons from Berkshire
Hathaway
On
Friday the investment press was full of stories from the latest release of
Berkshire Hathaway’s transactions for the quarter. All of these reports focused
exclusively on the names of the stocks that were bought and sold and none on the
structure of the overall equity portfolio. Thus, their readers missed the
opportunity to learn how the portfolio is managed.
The
company has at least eleven equity reporting elements excluding the investments
in their retirement accounts. Many equate the company to an open end mutual
fund, which is a mistake for in all of my work on US and foreign registered
funds I have never seen a portfolio that truly operates on the same basis.
First,
Berkshire’s equity portfolio is part of a complex series of holding companies
which include fixed income securities, liabilities, and substantial float of
“temporary” money that can be invested. Second, with rare exception there is no
pressure to liquidate assets to meet immediate redemption orders. Third, one of
the great assets the company has is its brand. In times of financial distress
on the part of others, the company can demand very high returns for the use of
its money to prop up the market value of large, high quality companies which
may be viewed as in distress. Fourth, the company can be extremely patient and
at the same time make very rapid decisions without the need for committee or
board actions. (These are some of the reasons that I am happy to be a long-term
shareholder for a fund I manage and personal accounts.) In my mind these
attributes are worth a premium over book value or if it were a fund, net asset
value.
Regular
readers of these posts have learned that I count the lessons that I learned at
the race track as important guides to my professional investment practice. Let
me define a winning day at the track, which is an enjoyable day in a pleasant
surrounding and walking away from the track with more money than I had before I
got to the track. As Yogi Berra is reported to have said, “You can see a lot by
observing.” I have seen numerous “horse players” that have cashed winning
tickets, but at the end of the day they are not qualified for my definition of
having a winning day because they go home poorer. Their mistake was not in
failing to pick winners, but in handling their money poorly. Often they made
too many bets, spent too much in meals and other entertainment, increased the
size of their bets to obtain break even and accepting of low odds by backing
favorites.
In
general Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, and their two investment managers are guilty
of these mistakes in managing the Berkshire stock portfolios. As of June 30,
2015 the reported total of the stock portfolio was $ 107.2 Billion. Only four
stocks represent 62.38% of the total, and another eleven stocks represent
27.01%. This last group of eleven individual holdings were each 1-5% of the
portfolio. There was another 11.61% spread through 31 names. While for some
purposes I like concentrated mutual fund portfolios, I can find very few
that would be this concentrated and they would have redemption problems where
Berkshire does not.
In
looking at their recent trading history one sees that many of the positions are
traded somewhat actively; enlarging and contracting the size of the position
and often changing the tax cost basis of the holding. These are done for
investment purposes not to accommodate flows which is often the case with funds.
While Berkshire is a prodigious net cash generator, I do not expect that there
will be a large flow into the current equity portfolios as the latest 100%
acquisition absorbs a good bit of the company’s preferred cash cushion or
strategic reserve which can be deployed within 24 hours on a potentially highly
profitable rescue mission. Perhaps most importantly, after due consideration, Berkshire
will liquidate a holding at a considerable loss and admit that they did faulty
analysis rather than blame external events.
If I were to recommend a Berkshire-type strategy for a managed account today, it would have a sufficient opportunity reserve to be able to take advantage of rapidly attractive situations when others are fearful. Further, I would use investment judgment in weighting my portfolio, something my older brother has been saying for some time. I would be selective in my diversification by only one or a few stocks in a sector, typically the best of breed. I might have some very small explorative positions with a sense of how long I would be willing to hold them. Most importantly I would try to be disciplined to admit analytical mistakes and discard losers regardless of costs.
Another
valuable lesson from the Racetrack
On
Friday there was a long and glowing obituary for John Nerud who died at 102
after saddling over 1,000 winners as a trainer or farm manager. He was the best
and worked for a great and generous owner. The lesson is that one can get the
horse wonderfully prepared to win the Kentucky Derby, employ one of the best
jockeys and give him good instructions. In this case when Willie Shoemaker was
leading with Gallant Man, the jockey mistook the finish line and stood up
briefly in his stirrups and let another horse win the Derby. A few weeks later
Gallant Man won the much more significant Belmont Stakes proving that he was
best three year old in the country. The lesson is that bad things unexpectedly
happen and we should not expect perfection in our choices, even when they are
eventually proven to be correct.
Another
Numbers Lesson
Many
value managers make their case on the basis that their holdings are selling at
low multiplies of stated book value.
While I am a believer in buying something at a discount from what a
knowledgeable buyer would pay for the asset, I have little confidence in the
book value calculation. Book value is derived from the balance sheet of the
enterprise. These are largely based on historic costs on periodic impairment
decisions by the company on the advice of their auditors. Rarely are assets written up, declines in market share are not recorded, contingent liabilities
are not deducted, the value of expiring patents is not noted, etc. The auditors
prepare balance sheets for creditors not equity owners. Too many investors
equate book value with the total net asset value of funds. They understand that
when they redeem their open end mutual funds they will be paid out on the basis of
the current net asset value.
However,
they fail to look at the way the market values net asset values of closed end
funds. Open end and closed end funds use the same calculations and auditors.
Because investors, through their brokerage firms, must find a ready buyer for
their closed end sales, the market functions to bring buyer and seller together
at an agreed price and time. Currently the discount on closed end funds to
their net asset value is approximately 10%, my friends at my old firm Lipper, Inc., tell
me. Thus my
starting point in looking at book value for companies before I reconstruct is
to assume a 10% discount from stated value. After reconstruction of an
updated appraisal of what a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the company my
estimated book value is very likely to be higher or lower of stated book value.
To me this is the proper approach for so-called value investors as distinct
from “quants” who don’t see beyond the published financial statements.
Question
of the week:
What circumstances would lead you to sell or to buy Berkshire Hathaway?
What circumstances would lead you to sell or to buy Berkshire Hathaway?
__________
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Copyright © 2008 - 2015
A.
Michael Lipper, C.F.A.,
All Rights Reserved.
Contact author for limited redistribution permission.
All Rights Reserved.
Contact author for limited redistribution permission.
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