Losses are inevitable
in all of life, including your investment portfolio. As a matter of fact, the only
thing I promise to those whose portfolios I manage is that I will make mistakes
for them, but hopefully they will be relatively small and quick, and that we
learn from them.
There are four kinds of
losses. The first is that the selection failed to deliver the expected result
because the choice was fundamentally flawed. The second is a faulty
understanding of how the particular investment actually works. The third is the
right idea, but the wrong timing. The fourth and the most dangerous to the
future of the people involved is not to learn from the losses. One of the few
things I did not learn from my experiences in the US Marine Corps is my motto
of “Blunder Forth,” but the key is to learn from past blunders and not to repeat
them.
Diversification
losses
Since few, if any of us
know with certainty what either the markets or the economy are going to do, it
is traditionally wise to hedge our bets. (This is why at the racetrack an
occasional bet on second place or even third makes more sense than only betting
to win, particularly in each race.) There are two active ways to hedge our
bets. One is to sell something short. The second is to buy something which is
likely to move in the opposite direction than the bulk of the portfolio is
expected to go.
Many institutional and
individual investors are hesitant to sell short because to be successful one
needs to get one’s timing right. Too few have a good history of this skill.
Many more investors look for contrary plays. Two of these are gold and TIPS
(Treasury Inflation Protected Securities). The owners of these are betting that
the current manipulation by the major central banks of the world will produce a
decline in the value of major currencies or create a large bout of inflation.
In the first half of 2013 neither of these calamities have occurred, therefore
these bets are considered by many to be losers. In most institutionally managed
portfolios the actual or paper gold (futures or gold mining shares), the gold
holding is less than 10% and in many cases below 5%. The purpose of the holding
is to act as a ‘canary
in a mine’ to signal an abrupt change of conditions which
has not yet happened. TIPS are typically held in a portfolio that also owns
other bonds or bond funds. The combination of the bond holdings is meant to
insure that when the bonds mature they will produce dollars that are equal in
spending power to the level of the dollars invested initially. For most of this
year TIPS have not been returning a real (inflation adjusted) return.
Are the investment in
gold and TIPS losers? I would say no. Because of some investment in TIPS, a
number of investors were able to have enough courage to own much larger
investment positions that had a more positive outlook than if they had not
owned TIPS. I would go further by saying
that a well-balanced portfolio could well be at its maximum risk of large
losses when all of its investments are showing significantly positive results.
It is unprepared for abrupt changes which have been known to happen.
However, there is a
risk which overtook investors in 2007-2009. The risk is that the protective
diversification schedule was trashed by the correlations (particularly on the
downside) among supposedly uncorrelated assets. I am not at all suggesting that
one should abandon diversification as a practice, but to be aware that there
will be times that supposedly uncorrelated prices will move together and only a
reasonable amount of cash or very short-term treasuries will supply some
ballast to a rapidly sinking portfolio.
Will
the Fed learn?
The two losing
diversification investments mentioned above were meant to be good diversifiers
against the actions of the US Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) and a number of
other national Central Banks in attempting to stimulate their economies by
depressing the natural risk-oriented interest rate levels. Perhaps it is
coincidence, but this week I have become conscious of four separate but
different comments that suggest that we are approaching a time when the
structure of the Fed may be changing. In order of their first appearance to me
the four are as follows:
1. As mentioned in last week’s post I chaired a
panel presentation on the impact of the media on the nature of “bubbles” with
Bill Cohan and Jason Zweig at the Columbia Club in New York. As is often the
case in these public sessions, the audience was less interested in history and
more interested in what to do now. One of the speakers who is a good historian
stated that the Fed is not very good about predictions. They have not done a
good job of predicting the economy and worse, they have been poor on predicting
what they would do in the future.
2. A “Hindsight” column in the New York
Times, included an article by Roger
Lowenstein entitled “The Fed Framers Would Be Shocked.” Roger is someone who
has written widely on the economy and the market, he is the independent chair of the Sequoia
Fund, a sound fund that comes out of the heritage of Warren Buffett’s original
hedge fund. He focuses on the concerns of many involved with the passage of the
act that created the Fed; that it would become too powerful and would drive the
economy. The authorization of the second Bank of the United States was allowed
to lapse because many feared control of our economic interests by a powerful
unelected body which would likely to be heavily vested by the ‘money trust’ bankers. In some ways this was a replay of the battle between local control and
national control, a battle that is still raging in education, medicine, and
other arenas that people care about.
3. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
functions as the central bank for the world’s central banks. In a report
released over the weekend, they urged the central banks to withdraw from the
stimulus business. The BIS felt that the proper function of the central banks
was inflation control not to provide growth impetus for their economies, which
is a function of the governments and their fiscal policies. An interesting article was published Sunday by the Telegraph, entitled:
“BIS Fears Fresh Bank Crisis from Global Bond Spike.”
“BIS Fears Fresh Bank Crisis from Global Bond Spike.”
4. There is a bill in Congress which removes
the double standard for the Fed by eliminating the responsibility to aid the
growth in the economy other than by attempting to control inflation.
I found it interesting that all seem to be forgetting that the original purpose of the Fed was to substitute a public source of capital to troubled banks replacing JP Morgan’s policy of forced cooperation. (Morgan once locked the participants of a key meeting in his library to force agreement among the solvent banks to provide bailouts to the distressed banks.)
I found it interesting that all seem to be forgetting that the original purpose of the Fed was to substitute a public source of capital to troubled banks replacing JP Morgan’s policy of forced cooperation. (Morgan once locked the participants of a key meeting in his library to force agreement among the solvent banks to provide bailouts to the distressed banks.)
Quite possibly these
and additional drumbeats may hasten changes in the proper use of the Fed.
Others are learning from the recent past, it will be interesting to see whether
the momentum for change will come from within the Fed or from external forces.
Conclusion
All of us, including
the Fed can learn from our past losers or mistakes.
From what losers have
you learned? Please share publicly or privately.
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Copyright © 2008 - 2013 A. Michael Lipper, C.F.A.,
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