The Mae West quote that
“too much of a good thing is wonderful” reflected her playful method of sexual
innuendo and is the way many investors view credit ratings. Upon her other
revelations, I do not believe that the burlesque queen, movie star and stripper
was conversant on how bond credit ratings affect relative stock price
performance. But that is the dilemma that I have been working on this week. I come to view this issue from two divergent vantage points .
My
challenge
I manage a number of balanced (bonds and stocks) accounts for
institutions as well as wealthy individuals. As part of our responsibility for
one client with multiple accounts we have the task of managing an
all fixed-income portfolio in separately managed fixed-income securities and
fixed-income mutual funds. In connection with this client I am reviewing and
updating the account’s investment policies. At the time of the inception of the
account in 2007 certain quality and diversification standards (or what now
appear to be constraints) were mandated. As mere thoughtful mortals drew up
these policies they did not consider the current tiny short-term interest rates
and their manipulation by the major central bankers of the so-called developed
world.
High quality, poor relative performance
My associates and I have been reviewing various stock investments of certain
equity funds to understand their past two years of relative under performance
compared to their perceived peers. In these cases the absolute performance of
individual stocks and funds has produced positive results. However their relative investment
performance was disappointing. The
one common characteristic of the portfolio managers of these funds is that they
are oriented toward owning high quality investments, a bias that I share. On
average many of these relatively underperforming stocks are higher quality than
those found in their relatively better performing peers.
These formerly
successful funds are believers in investing in quality companies many of which
would have sounder balance sheets and higher margins than found in their relatively better performing peers. The market
recovery phase started in 2009, accelerated in 2012 and continued thus far in
2013. During this period of extremely low interest rates the less credit worthy
companies were able to borrow money at historically low rates. With new capital
they expanded their capacity and were also able to lower their selling prices
which put their higher quality companies at a disadvantage, at least in the eyes
of the stock market.
The fiduciary’s selection dilemma
On the one hand we need to set the filters so that managed accounts
can meet their funding requirements under practically all absolute conditions. And
on the other hand we seek to earn relatively good intermediate and long-term
investment performance.
One of the characteristics of all professions is to use codes to
abbreviate concepts. In the investment world one very important code set is
bond credit ratings. These are thoughtfully issued by three major credit
ratings groups Moody’s*, Standard & Poor’s*, and
Fitch in various stylized alpha numeric abbreviations starting with the most
secure, AAA and declining in terms of potential defaults down to D. On average
and over time these ratings have done a more than reasonable job of alerting
investors as to forthcoming defaults. However, as with all work done by humans,
they are not perfect. As a practical matter investors worldwide recognize as
far as taxable issuers are concerned that the first four full ratings are
so-called “investment grade.” The term investment grade came out of a case
in the 1930s that decided that the first four grades (AAA, AA, A, BBB or their equivalents) were
appropriate as high quality investments for fiduciaries. Since then the lower
credit ratings were referred to in polite society as non-investment grade or
high yield but the in argot of “the
street” as junk. Notice this whole exercise deals with the probability of
timely payment of principal and interest, not whether they are good investments
particularly in considering current prices.
Funding vs.
performance
There is another decision tree axis which is not quite as well known, but
in many respects more important. The filter for this matrix is the earliest
expected involuntary pay back or maturity date. Once one is assured that the
debt will in all likelihood be paid back, the twin questions facing the
investor are how long will this stream of income be delivered and (in many ways
much more significantly) the interest earned on the reinvestment of the
interest received. For long-term bonds, under “normal” conditions, the size of
repayments of principal, total interest received and the income earned on
reinvestment are listed in reverse order of aggregate size. For instance even a
low 3% coupon payment reinvested for 30 years in available, high-quality paper
will be significantly greater than just adding up the interest payments paid on
the bond, or the return of the original issue price. While this concept of
interest on interest is mathematically correct, for many individual and
institutional investors it doesn’t work that way. The reason they own fixed-income
securities is so that they can consume the interest payments to meet their
various funding needs, for example to make grants, pay for maintenance of people and
facilities, etc.
Investment Policy Statements
One of the advantages of blogging is that occasionally one can see the discontinuity in one's thinking. Investment Policy Statements (IPS) are legal documents typically imbedded within contracts or board minutes. Often they are drawn up by lawyers or at least blessed by them. As with the U.S. Constitution, essentially they are limiting the powers; in this case the investment manager or investment committee. IPSs do not focus on how to make money for the account, but detail what not to do. This blinding realization came to me as I started to write about credit ratings, recognizing credit ratings can be sexy.
One of the advantages of blogging is that occasionally one can see the discontinuity in one's thinking. Investment Policy Statements (IPS) are legal documents typically imbedded within contracts or board minutes. Often they are drawn up by lawyers or at least blessed by them. As with the U.S. Constitution, essentially they are limiting the powers; in this case the investment manager or investment committee. IPSs do not focus on how to make money for the account, but detail what not to do. This blinding realization came to me as I started to write about credit ratings, recognizing credit ratings can be sexy.
AAA vs. AA
We prize high credit ratings in an IPS, the closer to AAA, the better. In terms of attempting to make money for the account, as an analyst/portfolio manager and investor there are times that I question the cost to the investor of an AAA rating. Let me give an example of two holdings in my private financial services fund. Both Automatic Data Processing* and Berkshire Hathaway* are major beneficiaries of the floats of their clients' money. At one time both companies had AAA ratings. Now ADP has the highest rating, Berkshire does not. (Berkshire was downgraded to AA some time ago.) ADP is one of a handful of large US companies that has an AAA. The reasons given for the downgrade of Berkshire was the increasing risks inherent in its reinsurance activities. Both of these companies have had a practice of acquiring other companies. ADP has slowed down in these activities while Berkshire has not, as it has been buying large and mid-sized companies. While both companies' stocks and bonds have risen in price, the AA has clearly outperformed the AAA. Many analysts believe if ADP could find suitable acquisitions that do not threaten the perceived quality of its large short-term float, the prices of its securities would have done better.
Betting against dropping ratings
Recently Moody's* announced that will be lowering the ratings on four of the leading financial services companies; JP Morgan*, Goldman Sachs*, Morgan Stanley* and Wells Fargo*. For the moment Moody’s is leaving the ratings on Bank of America* and Citigroup* unchanged. Interesting the two unchanged companies have very recently done better shedding their endangered zombie species. The bulls on these two stocks will acknowledge that they are work in progress with the hope that they can approximate the returns of the four leaders.
The official reason for the downgrade is the belief that if any of the four leaders ran into financial problems the levels of bailout will be less. Quite possibly true, but I wonder how germane? As an investor and entrepreneur addicted to the long-term, I would much rather own the businesses and more importantly the people of the four leaders than the two turnaround candidates. If protecting their credit ratings and other fortress-like characteristics has prevented them from intelligently expanding their activities or handling their leverage better, the lower ratings could help us shareholders.
I could use your help
I am still struggling with what to put into an institutional IPS in terms of its fixed-income investment accounts to meet some specific needs as well as general strategic balancing needs. Please contact me with your views.
_________________________________
Copyright © 2008 - 2013 A. Michael Lipper, C.F.A.,
All Rights Reserved.
Contact author for limited redistribution permission.
No comments:
Post a Comment