Two Questions: Length of Recession, Near-Term Strategy Choices - Weekly Blog # 600

Mike Lipper’s Monday Morning Musings

Two Questions: Length of Recession, Near-Term Strategy Choices

Editors: Frank Harrison 1997-2018, Hylton Phillips-Page 2018 –

Authors Note # 1 
This is our six hundredth blog. I hope you have gotten some worthwhile ideas to help with your investment responsibilities. My goal is to provide at least two ideas a year that make you think about your process, either differently or more thoroughly. As we are approaching our 12th year, I want to thank our subscribers who have shared their thoughts with me. These thoughts have helped me to reach our goals. I also want to thank my two editors who have been long term associates, the late Frank Harrison and his successor Hylton Phillips-Page. They have turned into English my too long Germanic sentences.

Length of Next Recession 
Any study of nature and economic history will show repeated periods of expansion (fat years) and contraction (lean years). In studying history, I believe they are not only inevitable, but required. It is important to separate economic contractions, which we call recessions, and market crashes. They are often in close proximity to one another, but not always. Economic recessions have a much greater impact on investment portfolios than so-called stock market crashes. For example, while much media focus continues to be on the October 1929 market crash, there is little mentioned that by December of that year the Dow Jones Industrial Average had risen back to its October levels. Thus, the crash was a technical dislocation and was not in itself a cause of the recession, or the psychological term that’s been applied, The Great Depression.

The historic reasons for contractions after periods of expansion, either in nature or economics, is an unsustainable expansion. There are many causes for unsustainable expansions:

• Changes in climate
• The outgrowth of war on both the victor and victim
• Confusing secular growth with cyclical growth to meet a temporary demand vacuum
• Too low or too high prices
• Leaders of governments and/or businesses attempting to extend a tiring expansion
• Loose credit that keeps both companies and individuals seemingly solvent, but creates zombies awaiting bankruptcy
• Excess capacity creating excess supply, driving prices lower among competitors 

If recessions are inevitable, what is the question for investors? 
The question is the time span of the recession. Most modern recessions, as reflected by the stock market, have a duration of about 2 years (1-3 years). Considering the folly of those who have been correct in spotting a price peak and then have being wrong about the bottom and subsequent tops, I will not attempt to call an end to the current dance.

Considering my focus on long term investment accounts, it raises some questions. Does one stay with sound portfolio holdings enjoying the expansion, on the belief that their past gains will carry them through a roughly two-year decline. While not publicly admitting that this is their strategy, most individuals and institutional investors are currently following this strategy. There are however other issues that should be examined:

• The current US stock market expansion is over ten years old.
• Governments around the world are actively pushing nominal and inflation adjusted "real" rates down, creating zombies out of both corporations and individuals who should be exiting their debt. 
• Not fully understanding that technology drives prices down, changing purchasing habits and creating deflationary trends which are often elements of a financial collapse. For example, there were those who believed we had seen peak auto production in the 1990s in Japan and in 2016 in the USA. These beliefs resulted from changing demographics, living habits, ride sharing, and the growth of US public transportation. Without a strong auto industry politics would change, as well as many other things. 

If our next recession lasts five or possibly ten years, shouldn't we be change our portfolios?
The problem with equity type risk in stocks, high yield bonds, and private equity/credit, is what to change it to? While mutual fund investors are not always right, it is interesting to note that the largest net flows are currently going into money market funds, followed by high quality commercial bonds.

As usual, Jason Zweig of The Wall Street Journal had some things to ponder. He reported that in 1929, on the basis of the radio boom, the Radio Corporation of America had a price/earnings ratio of 73 times and a price to book-value ratio of 16 times. Amazon, because of the promise of "the Cloud", recently had the same numbers if not higher.

Author's Note #II 
In the early 1960s I was a young analyst awaiting the boom in color television. After many years it finally happened, with RCA rising above its 1929 peak. The color television boom grew slowly because of the difficulty in producing acceptable quality television picture tubes. There were only a handful of suppliers and RCA was late in converting one of its factories in Pennsylvania to a color picture tube plant. Thus, I and many analysts visited the plant, followed by lunch with their management at the local country club.

The meeting date was November 23rd, 1963. It began and effectively ended with the announcement that President JFK had been shot and later died. Clearly, there were lots of unanswered questions at that time. One that struck me came from a well-know, but nameless analyst “what was happening to stocks on the American Stock Exchange?” This was significant because the largest manufacturer of color tubes was listed on the ASE. My guess is that he personally held that speculative stock with a large borrowed balance. The markets quickly closed to prevent a panic which would have wiped out many, including those on borrowed margin.

It was a very silent time on the train ride home from Pennsylvania that night, but it gave many of us a real understanding of the risks we were taking and how volatile markets can react to the unexpected. This kind of experience shapes one’s thinking for a lifetime. The US markets reopened the following Monday morning to reassure buyers.

Near-Term Strategy Choices 
In my role of selecting mutual funds for clients, I am always looking to balance the risks and rewards of investing. My associate Hylton and I do this is by reading financial documents and visiting many successful managers. This weekend I reviewed the strategies of a number of successful managers. I am happy to have a discussion with subscribers to see if any of these strategies fit within their responsibilities. The following list is not in preference order, but in the order of when I read their latest report:

1. Import substitution (A bet on lessening globalization)
2. Mid-Cap Opportunities (Not particularly unexploited)
3. Better stock prices in China (Taking advantage of retail selling)
4. Overweight financials (Contrarian bet on rising interest rates, which seems inevitable)
5. Market share can be better than reported earnings if it is profitable and leads to higher EPS
6. Cautious on momentum (already happening)
7. Illiquidity is expected to get worse
8. Investment decisions are based on current prices, not macro views. 
9. Absence of bargains (Warren Buffett's complaint) 

Questions for the week: 
What portion of your portfolio could successfully survive a long recession?



Did you miss my past few blogs? Click one of the links below to read.
https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/10/things-are-seldom-what-they-seem-weekly.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/10/mike-lippers-monday-morning-musings.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/10/contrarian-bets-and-other-risks-weekly.html



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"Things are Seldom what they Seem" - Weekly Blog # 599

Mike Lipper’s Monday Morning Musings

"Things are Seldom what they Seem"

Editors: Frank Harrison 1997-2018, Hylton Phillips-Page 2018 –

Premise 
Things are seldom what they seem is an appropriate maxim for military reconnaissance, home buyers, merger & acquisition specialists, political and security analysts, and most importantly long-term surviving investors. When surface observations prove to be accurate, popular rewards tend to be small and when they are wrong the penalties can be large. This week I share three instances where a deeper understanding of what is popularly "known" are examined more broadly.

"Informed Prices" 
On Friday the Dow Jones Industrial average fell 255 points, with 67 of those points in the last half hour. Before using these "knowns", one should examine the makeup of the numbers and their implications. First, almost two-thirds of the decline was caused by just two stocks, Boeing and Johnson & Johnson. Boeing's fall is particularly significant because the DJIA is a price weighted average and it’s fall disproportionately impacted the result, as it is the highest price stock in the index.

As an analyst/portfolio manager, the larger implication lies in reviewing the investment selection criteria. Statistically oriented pundits and marketers generally want to sum up the company's results using factors such as changes in earnings, returns on equity or capital, revenues, or book values etc.

Both the price declines of Boeing and J&J were responses to internal disclosures. In Boeing's case it was a reaction to emails from the chief pilot expressing doubts on the Max 737. In J&J's case it was the discovery of a single batch of contaminated product. Neither of these disclosures were or could have been captured by any known factors. Ever since investors have compared investments and managers they have utilized screens to highlight and understand differences. Rarely was success the result of one management being smarter than others, it was often due to comprehending what was not captured in the statics, i.e. patents, customers, locations etc.

In the following market factors for the week I found issues of future importance, which I would be happy to discuss further with subscribers:

1. There were price gaps from earlier in October in all three major stock indices.
2. There were differences in the patterns of the high/low ratios for stocks on the two stock exchanges - NYSE 303/101 and NASDAQ 197/230
3. On the NYSE the volume of shares going up was very close to the number of shares going down.

"Plain English" can be Plain Wrong 
Jason Zweig, in an always interesting column in The Wall Street Journal, described attempts by a member of Congress and the SEC to force mutual funds to issue a new four-page document in "Plain English". Ironically, this is an effort to correct errors of judgement by both the Congress and the SEC. A generation or two ago there used to be an active retail market for investments in most cities and towns in ground floor stock brokerage offices. Their longevity was a testament to the value they were providing. They existed because busy people who recognized their lack investment knowledge needed help, the situation is no different today. In many cases the customers', man or woman, provided good service to the investing public and many of their recommendations proved to be profitable for both the investors and the brokerage firms. I believe the average retail investor's returns were superior to those of today, in part due to lower interest rates. Perhaps unconsciously, the SEC destroyed this setup by removing fixed commission rates. (That is not to say that there weren’t some abuses and bad judgments made.)

The SEC has faith in the disclosure of "facts", and numbers are even better. For a while it considered requiring funds to publish their beta numbers, urged on by the late and sometimes great Jack Bogel. Luckily, the requirement was dropped after being ignored and considered something of questionable utility. (It could have had some value as an annual or market phase measures.) Digital representation are an attempt to capture reality. While most critical decisions are reached through analog searches and comparisons, JP Morgan himself said that he did not lend based on collateral, but on character. The new document cannot correct for a poor education. Many successful investors learned early about budgeting their time and resources, without which no four pager or four thousand pager will produce on average, winnings.

When someone asks for my help with their investments, the first thing I should ask is how much time they intend to devote to investing. For those devoting "twenty minutes or less", I suggest that they either find someone they trust to manage their money or just accept one or more fixed rate investments. For the remaining few, I would be happy to introduce you to the multi-level set of investments arts.

"Follow the Leader" is Chasing one's Tail or Worse
As someone, with the help of a great staff, who probably created more lists of leaders and laggards than perhaps any other person, I can appreciate the media and spectators knowing who are at the "tops of the pops". Unfortunately, people don’t evaluate all the short to long-term time periods, or how quickly a name rotates from the leaders lists to the laggard roster. That is a mistake, but it is even worse to not notice the change in market conditions.

As an outsourced chief investment officer and a member of non-profit investment committees, I have seen a growing share of assets devoted to private equity and debt. In a recent article in FT WEALTH devoted to Family offices, a survey showed that over 80% are using private equity investments through funds or fund of funds. They are following the lead of certain Ivy League universities which have been investing in private equity for two generations. In the early years these schools produced results superior to the public market. At one of these investment committee meetings the members were presented with a book authored by one of the in-house chief investment officers, highlighting his success in investing in privates. That was then, today most of the former leaders have completed a year where in aggregate they underperformed the public market measures. What happened? The structure of the market was changed dramatically by the SEC’s efforts to make investing easier.

The way investments are taught in most places focuses almost entirely or totally on the issuer of the securities. However, the company is only one of five forces on the price and utility of investing in the security. The others are the needs of the customer, the compensation for marketing, the profitability of the firms that provide investment management, investment banking and trading, the changing nature of the exchanges, and the attitudes of the reviewers/critics.

The combination of generally declining profitability caused by the SEC’s elimination of fixed rate commissions and the long-term decline in real interest rates altered the commercial needs of the players other than the issuer and dramatically changed the market for privates. For over two generations brokerage firm equity/agency commissions were unprofitable. Their profits came from net interest on margin loans, dealing spreads, underwriting, financial advisory activities and investing for their own accounts.

This led the institutional sales force and eventually the retail sales force to shift to the sale of private securities, either individually or in packaged products of funds. In order to supply their sales forces, many firms got into the business of underwriting or offering private securities. They were often directly or indirectly paid in shares of the products they were selling. While a couple generations ago there were only a few in these markets, now almost all the firms that have survived are there.

At the same time successful managers of private venture funds were regularly coming to market with new merchandise. Owners of private companies therefore had many underwriters and investors competing for an interest in their companies, leading to higher prices. That was sustainable if these companies went public at sufficiently high prices to create profits for all who participated in the build up to the sale. It all worked as long as the IPOs rose in price long enough for all the willing restricted stock to be sold. In 2019 we have seen some IPOs break below the offer price and some have been withdrawn.

I have witnessed first-hand the success that Caltech's investment staff and appropriate consultants have generally had with their privates. They have worked long, hard and smart. I am convinced that there are few groups that have a similar dedication to this effort.

One of the general lessons in investing is that it is difficult to make meaningful gains in crowded trades and they can be very unprofitable if the crowd attempts to stampede out.



Did you miss my past few blogs? Click one of the links below to read.
https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/10/mike-lippers-monday-morning-musings.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/10/contrarian-bets-and-other-risks-weekly.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/09/mixed-near-term-after-recession.html



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Copyright © 2008 - 2019
A. Michael Lipper, CFA

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Where is the Stock Market Going? ESG Might Learn from Columbus - Weekly Blog # 598

Mike Lipper’s Monday Morning Musings

Where is the Stock Market Going? ESG Might Learn from Columbus

Editors: Frank Harrison 1997-2018, Hylton Phillips-Page 2018 –

CORRECT CONTRARIAN CALL SETS UP WARNING
In last week’s blog we expressed our contrarian view that the next move of the US stock market was up. On Friday afternoon the market shot up and was able to keep most of its gains by the close. Even when flipping coins, the odds of a trend continuing or reversing does not change. However, as a contrarian I am worried about being successively right. (In the early 1960s I was right in choosing specific stocks six times in a row; it ruined me in terms of the only real product of the stock market = humility. Hopefully, I have fully recovered.)

In addition to not trusting in a continuation of a trend, there are two signs that should sound some caution. The first deals with the difference in outlook of investors vs. speculators. In an over-simplification one could suggest that the bulk of the money invested in New York Stock Exchange stocks is for investment, while the bulk of the money invested in NASDAQ stocks is more speculative short-term. In the week ended Friday, the number of new lows on the NYSE was 147 vs. 302 for the NASDAQ.  Part of the reason for this dichotomy is that the focus of investment leadership may have changed. Using mutual fund performance averages for the week ended Thursday, before the sharp gain on Friday, the best category average return was achieved by World Equity funds +0.81%, which beat the return of +0.52% for US Diversified Equity funds. The average sector funds declined slightly -0.04%. Expanding the performance lens to the month of September, I looked selectively at the performance of some T. Rowe Price funds (*) to get a clue as to the future direction from the following list:

                            September 
Fund                       Performance
Financial Services            +3.36%
New Asia                      +3.15
New Era                       +2.66
Emerging Market Stock         +2.25
Growth Stock                  –0.99

The two leading sectors in the Financial Services fund were banks and insurance, both of which trailed earlier in the year. New Asia is heavily invested in China and India. New Era was a fund designed by Mr. Price himself, to serve as an inflation protected portfolio invested in energy and other commodity related issues. The Growth Stock fund is led by FAANG stocks and a small position in pre-IPO investments. I have hedged our larger positions in Growth Stock and similar funds with international funds, inflation sensitive funds, financial service funds and some stocks. The purpose of hedging is to have some relative winners when long-term, attractive growth stock investments, are experiencing difficulties in the short-term.

(*) Owned in our private Financial Services Fund and in personal accounts.

The second short-term factor is that the overall US stock market, as currently priced, is clearly in the middle of its valuation range. The following statistics are in general flat with a year ago:

                        Current     Year Ago
Indicator               Reading     Reading
DJIA Yield               2.20%       2.19%
S&P 500 Yield            2.00%       1.99%
Market/Book - DJIA       4.12x       4.09x
Market/Book - S&P 500    3.49x       3.35x
Consumer Prices         +1.74%      +1.74%
Inflation               +1.70%      +1.70%

Perhaps the most reassuring indicator is a contrarian one. The current American Association of Individual Investor's weekly sample survey has a bearish reading of 44%. As noted in prior blogs, readings over 40% are extremely rare. Three weeks ago this number was 33%, demonstrating its volatility.

SHORT-TERM WARNING
We may create an important barrier to future higher prices if within a reasonably short period we do not see record price levels with expanding volume.

• Some may view multiple attempts to achieve new highs as a sign of a market top after rising for more than ten years. 
• Many stock holders disappointed with the lack of progress in their particular selections may see the current price level as a good exiting opportunity. 
• From an analytical viewpoint, if the seller’s volume is larger than the buyer’s appetite, near-term prices will decline. I emphasize near-term because sellers are often sold out bulls, who feel compelled to re-enter the market regardless of price for fear of missing out (FOMO).

COLUMBUS DAY LESSONS FOR ESG INVESTMENTS BY INSTITUTIONS
Most Americans have been brought up to celebrate Columbus Day, “the discovery of America”. They are familiar with the story of Christopher Columbus who convinced the Queen of Spain to use her jewels to pay for his three ships. These ships set off to find a new route to India and found an island in the Caribbean instead. He is celebrated for his persistence and courage to go where nobody had reportedly gone before. Instead of this tale being taught in elementary schools, the real story should be taught in business schools, particularly in advanced investment and marketing classes. (The latter has to do with one of America’s great resources, the ability to sell myths.) The real story is very different than the one presented to children.

THE REAL STORY
Spain’s main competitor and neighbor was Portugal. The king of Portugal was known as Henry, The Navigator.  He funded a series of voyages along the African coast and eventually had one of his ships round the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of the continent. Later, his ships landed in India and he was able to set up the spice trade. In the time of no refrigeration spices were extremely valuable in Europe. They had learned from Marco Polo that the addition of spices preserved the taste of meat.

When Columbus was attempting to raise money for his venture, Spain was in the midst of the forced conversion or expulsion of Jews. Not only was the Inquisition expensive, but it wiped out much of the merchant class in the country. The Queen, recognizing the need to divert attention from the expulsion and poor state of its economy, found in Columbus a “pigeon”, or a willing accomplice.

Columbus today would be called a skilled marketer with a smattering of scientific knowledge. Most other explorative voyages were done with a single ship, not three. So, like most marketeers, Columbus overspent. He was not a good manager or leader, suffering a mutiny and the loss of one of his ships. When he landed he did not know where and what he brought back was of little economic value. But like a good marketer, he was able to raise funding for two additional voyages.

In one respect Spain got very little from its investment in the spice trade. However, Spain got a great deal from its discovery of gold and silver, in countries with weak militaries. Spain, along with Portugal, seized Latin America and parts of what is now the US. (Interesting enough, the smaller of the two occupiers got the biggest piece of South America, Brazil.) In some respects, the rest of Europe paid for Spain’s success. The gold from Latin America created two hundred years of inflation and shifted the political power bases within Europe. Perhaps due to inflation, other European countries avoided funding exploration and development directly, licensing private companies to do it for them instead. The Dutch and English were particularly successful, their effort lasting longer than that of the Spanish.

COLUMBUS AND ESG INVESTING BY INSTITUTIONS
ESG is a series of views for the protection and improvement of the world. ESG stands for Environmental, Social and Governance, which some investment institutions impose on businesses, not governments. They hope to shame, or through the use of proxies, force businesses to improve their conduct. These improvements include how companies treat the environment, how they interact with their communities and workers, and the composition their boards and management. They do not appear to be concerned with the cost of their actions, which will be felt by shareholders and customers. One example is the use of tax subsidies to lower the initial cost of electric cars. There is no concern that the electricity used, particularly in China, comes from burning coal to generate electricity, or that these vehicles will require fewer workers to build or maintain. This is not to say that ESG issues should not be addressed, but the total cost for all stakeholders needs to be understood and managed.

For proponents of ESG they should consider a possible parallel with the lessons of Columbus. Both Spain in its time and the boards of various fiduciary institutions today have looked for things that do not exist in reality:

• Both have spent other people’s money without the direct authorization of the beneficiaries 
• Both were exposed to some very successful marketing
• Both needed to focus attention away from a world of low returns
• Neither wanted to turn over development to private enterprise, with their history of frequent and periodic measurement, and audits
• Both appear to have been unconcerned with the consequences of their effect on others

This is not to downplay the need for answers to society’s problems, but there is a concern about the instruments being used.



Question: 
What are your thoughts about the short-term outlook for the market or the Columbus Day lessons?



Did you miss my past few blogs? Click one of the links below to read.
https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/10/contrarian-bets-and-other-risks-weekly.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/09/mixed-near-term-after-recession.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/09/capital-cycles-changing-weekly-blog-595.html



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Copyright © 2008 - 2019
A. Michael Lipper, CFA

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Contact author for limited redistribution permission.

Contrarian Bets and other Risks - Weekly Blog # 597

Mike Lipper’s Monday Morning Musings

Contrarian Bets and other Risks

Editors: Frank Harrison 1997-2018, Hylton Phillips-Page 2018 –

A good bit of the reported sentiment suggests we are entering a significant market decline, followed shortly by a recession. To the extent that these opinions represent the popular view, my training at the New York racetracks suggests a contrarian view. The popular view is driven by a two day, eight-hundred-point decline in the DJIA, or an approximately 3% change compared to a frequent daily movement of about 1%.

There are two statistical measures that are also pointing down. These have often been wrong in terms of the direction of the US stock market for the ensuing six months, as indicated below:

• American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) surveys a sample of its membership each week to determine if they are bullish, neutral, or bearish on the US stock market. Extreme views are those values above 40% or under 20%. This latest week, Bullish sentiment was 21% and Bearish 39%. Three weeks ago, showing how volatile these views can be, the Bulls represented 35% and the Bears 28%.
• The buyers of Put and Call options are very focused on the near-term and when the Puts (bets on stock prices declining) reach historically extreme levels, they become contrarian indicators. Last week the ratio of puts to calls on the S&P 100 Index was 236 to 100. Similarly, the overall ratio of puts to calls was an above normal 73 to 100, normal is 60/100.

Longer-Term Risks
I previously noted that one of the most successful corporate pension funds moved out of equities years ago after they produced a 20% annual gain. They thought the result was unusual because it was between 2 and 3 times their actuarial assumption, suggesting they should withdraw from equities until the following year.

There are hardly any two-year periods with two back-to-back +20% gaining years. As of the end of the first nine months of 2019 there were 14 mutual fund investment objective averages producing +20% or more returns. Of these, the two biggest gainers in the last ten years on an annualized compound growth basis were  Large Cap Growth +13.37% and Multi-Cap Growth +13.21%. I suspect that the average fund in those two categories was loaded with what we used to label FAANG stocks (These averages with the leading performers are clearly doing a lot better than +20%).

Perhaps even more instructive is that the leading investment objective average for the last ten years was Health/Biotech Funds, which rose +15.41% but gained only +6.2% in the first nine months of this year. (For those who are going to be judged by their performance over the next five years it may be prudent to reduce exposure to managers that have produced +20% gains this year, with the understanding that these reserves will be recommitted to equities near the end of the next recession.)

There are other risks beyond staying too long with oversized winners. The biggest one has two names, prediction risk and execution risk. Most future projections are linear in nature and tend to be top-down, starting with aggregate demand or top-line revenues. Sports gives us two examples where this doesn’t work.

While I used to manage the National Football League-NFL Players Association Defined Contribution Plan, I do not claim to be a football analyst. However, I suspect more touchdowns are earned by broken plays than those illustrated on chalk boards in training camps. One of the great heavyweight boxers used to say that plans evaporate the moment your opponent hits you in the face. Far too many analysts and investors take future guidance from a company as a somewhat guaranteed plan. To me, I try to focus on the execution risks of any plan. I try to get some understanding as to what could go wrong and most importantly who will fix it. What I learned in the US Marines was that officers issue the orders of a plan, but enlisted men (particularly the corporals and sergeants) accomplished the missions, regardless of what is on paper. That is why in looking at operating companies I like to have an idea of who the supervisors, directors, and department heads are. With funds, while the portfolio managers are important, the key decisions are in effect often made by the analysts, traders, marketers, salespeople, administrators and occasionally the chief investment officer. These are the people who will execute the reality and are critical in our decision-making process.

One final set of risks bearing down on the current investment process comes with the initials ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance). This is not the appropriate vehicle to discuss the validity of the arguments for and against these tenants. My concern is that beneficiaries will suffer because insufficient attention is paid to prediction and execution risks. Below is a list of past predictions in terms of climate change which have already proven to be wrong:

          Year   Prediction

• 1966 - Oil gone in ten years
• 1970 - Ice age by 2000
• 1976 - Scientific consensus of planet cooling, famines imminent
• 1977 - Department of Energy says oil will peak in the 1990s
• 1988 - Maldives islands will be underwater by 2018
• 1988 - World’s leading climate expert predicts lower Manhattan underwater by 2018
• 1989 - Rising sea levels will obliterate nations if nothing is done by 2000
• 2005 - Fifty million climate refugees by 2020

Source: Calafia Beach Pundit quoting Mark Perry’s blog

While most of us are occasionally wrong in our own predictions, we need to understand the basis for forming the prediction.

The Biggest Risk to Fixed Income Investors
Having just questioned the process of predicting, I call to your attention a presentation made by Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis of the Congressional Budget Office to the National Association of State Budget Officers on “The Long-Term Budget Outlook”. The bottom line is that the CBO estimates that there is a two-thirds chance that federal debt will be between 71% and 175% of GDP in 2039. The two biggest culprits are major health care programs and net interest. Of the major developed countries, the only two running a surplus are South Korea and Russia. It seems likely to me that that many governments will increase their efforts to overcome the drawdown from innovation by materially increasing the global rate of inflation. This raises the potential of insufficient funding to satisfy fixed income beneficiary needs. 



Did you miss my past few blogs? Click one of the links below to read.
https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/09/mixed-near-term-after-recession.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/09/capital-cycles-changing-weekly-blog-595.html

https://mikelipper.blogspot.com/2019/09/concentrate-or-diversify-2-questions.html



Did someone forward you this blog?
To receive Mike Lipper’s Blog each Monday morning, please subscribe by emailing me directly at AML@Lipperadvising.com

Copyright © 2008 - 2019
A. Michael Lipper, CFA

All rights reserved
Contact author for limited redistribution permission.