Introduction
In order to guide my
investing for clients to better futures, I am a student of markets and people.
As with a number of others I spent Saturday morning reading Warren Buffett’s
thirty page shareholder letter, edited as usual by Carol Loomis. Unlike others
I was not disappointed with the letter for I did not expect a discussion of
potential successors to the young Charlie Munger (92) or Warren (85) himself.
Further I felt that this was not the likely forum for a discussion of current
underperformance. As usual, I found the letter to be rich in investment
lessons. A full academic year devoted to the study of Berkshire Hathaway would
be better spent than on many graduate investment courses and at least one of
the three Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) exams.
Four
Berkshire Lessons
The first lesson
requires one to examine and think about the very first page of the letter. The first page shows the year by year performance of the company’s book
value, market value of the shares, and the performance of the S&P 500 with
dividends included; a remarkable fifty year record. For reasons to
be discussed a little later I ignored the book value column and focused on the
market value changes and the S&P 500. A quick tabulation will show that
there were eleven down years and nine when the gains were less than the market.
Thus for some 40% of the time there were annual disappointments, but remember
over this period in aggregate the gain was 1,598,284% or 20.8% per annum. Two
critical observations of the math: first, if one of the world’s best long-term
investors can deliver some disappointment 40% of the time, we should not hold
ourselves or our investment managers to a higher standard. The second
observation: in a secular expansion enough of the time the upside is bigger
than the downside. This is similar to one of the lessons from betting at the
race track which is that if you are careful with your money you can walk away
most days cashing only one of three bets.
The fund analyst in me
suggests that a stock-only
index is inappropriate. Berkshire has always carried a great amount of
fixed income in its portfolio. To some degree this is offset by the large float
from unpaid future claims that leverages the company’s own equity. I would
prefer the comparison to be made to the Lipper Balanced Fund Index which we use
as a benchmark for our mixed asset accounts.
Book Value is not a
Good Measure
Warren Buffett attacks the use of
book value, even though he displays it. He quite rightly points out that
the accountants only allow write downs to historical costs, not any write ups.
I agree and carry these concerns further to the calculation of tangible capital
per share which is used widely in bank presentations. The difference between
the two Goodwill numbers is deducted from book value to derive tangible
capital. Because Berkshire, is in its own words, a “heavily asset sensitive”
company, some may view the company as largely a financial that will benefit
from rising interest rates thus a focus on tangible capital could be useful. (As
both a buyer and seller of intellectual property companies, I question the
mathematical expression of Goodwill, not its long-term utility.) In the early
days when Berkshire Hathaway was essentially a public investment holding
company, book value or what we call in the fund business net asset value was
useful, but not recently as the company is growing its operating asset base.
Conversion of
Investment Assets to Operating Assets
For some time and
increasing recently, Berkshire is using its investment analysis skills to
recognize external companies or parts of companies that could be more
attractive than portfolio holdings. The report mentions two that will become
significant operating earnings producers next year. Precision Castparts Corp. (PCC)
which was originally a relative small investment holding which led to a
complete purchase. Duracell was owned by Procter & Gamble and was acquired
in a stock swap transaction which was similar to one Berkshire conducted earlier when its shares of the
old Washington Post, now known as Graham Holdings, were exchanged for Graham's television
stations and other operations.
The key lesson here is
that when Berkshire can find attractive operating assets at reasonable prices, it would rather own them than publicly
traded stocks. In effect Berkshire is buying private equity. Apparently it can do this well. I am concerned that far too many institutions are being sold units in
private equity funds. I suspect that private equity funds with their need to
put their raised capital to work before they raise their next fund will overpay
for private companies and reduce somewhat the opportunities to buy good private
companies at a reasonable price. For some private owner/operators, Berkshire
presently can be more attractive owners than the more transient private equity
funds.
Bullish on Investing
Because of expected
productivity growth partially due to technology, and a global secular growth of
more people entering the markets for goods and services, over time the
economies will grow. One of Berkshire Hathaway's investments is in Goldman Sachs which we also
own. Almost one quarter of Goldman’s work force is in its technology division
with 80% involved with programming. Clearly much of what they are working on is
to comply with control and compliance needs, however I suspect that they are
using these talents to find new, improved ways to make money. (JP Morgan Chase
has similar efforts on a bigger canvas.)
Other Inputs
At JP Morgan Chase’s
Investor Day, CEO Jamie Dimon, stated that within twenty years China is likely
to be the home of over 35% of the world’s billion dollar companies. Others have
noted that Beijing has more dollar billionaires than New York.
In January, which was a
brutal investment month, according to the ICI domestic equity funds had net
redemptions of ‑$15.6 billion, but there were two groups of funds that had
positive sales; World Equity Funds + $10.4 billion and Municipal Bond funds +$
4.3 billion. Not everyone is retreating.
Bottom Line
While it is popular to
believe that interest rates will remain depressed for longer and therefore investors
should be reducing their risks, I am taking the opposite view. The absence of
bulls makes me bullish, in part because if I am wrong, there is little risk.
The reasons that Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon are buying are not the same
as mine, however in the long run I believe we are doing the responsible thing.
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A. Michael Lipper, C.F.A.,
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All Rights Reserved.
Contact author for limited redistribution permission.